Mer om Israel Shamir, Johannes Wahlström och Wikileaks.

För någon vecka sen avslöjade Expressen att Wikileaks centrata kontaktperson i Ryssland är ingen mindre än Israel Shamir, pappa till den journalist i Sverige som fått rollen som en sorts ”kontaktperson” för Wikileaks här, dvs Johannes Wahlström. Igår avslöjade Dagens Nyheter att samme Israel Shamir stöder Lukasjenko i Vitryssland och att Wikileaksdoument används för att kasta skit på de demokratiska krafterna i landet.

Var god avslägsna era foliehattar för en sekund.

Detta är inget att ta lätt på. Tyvärr vet ganska få ännu vad Israel Shamir står för. Israel försvarar Sions Vises Protokoll, pratar om judiska konspirationer (som Bonniers i Sverige anses vara en del av t.ex.), han frotterar sig med förintelseförnekare och har jobbat på den ryska antisemitiska tidningen Zavtra.

Om Wikileaks hade fått Ahmed Rami, eller galne Omar i Uppsala som sin svenska talesman, och om Ahmed rami åkt till vitryssland för att försvara Lukasjenko med hjälp av Wikileaksdokument hade Wikileaks varit dött och begravet i Sverige direkt. Ingen hade tagit dem på allvar igen!

Israel Shamir är tio gånger värre än Ahmed Rami, i sitt politiska budskap och i sin politiska betydelse!

Jag stöder Wikileaks arbete med att publicera dokumenten, men känner mig mer och mer kluven. Varför i h….  samarbetar Wikileaks med Israel Shamir och hans son och medarbetare Johannes Wahlström? Är det kanske t.o.m för att Shamir skapat myten om att de svenska kvinnor som anklagar honom för sexuellt utnyttjande är CIA agenter?

Att inte folk reagerar beror på att Israel Shamir är ganska okänd… mer än för oss som följt Expo.

Vi ska använda Wikileaks dokument för att kräva svar från nationer, politiker och myndigheter vad de pysslar med, men jag kräver samma ansvar av Wikileaks som jag kräver av stater. Alltså: vad pysslar Wikileaks med?

Lite transparency kanske?

Har någon några interna dokument från Wikileaks att läcka som vi kan publicera? Lite interna hemliga mail som avslöjar hur Julian Assange tänkt då han lejt Shamir och Wahlström kanske?

(Läs även vad jag skrev i november: Hur f-n tänker Aftonbladet?)

PS

För att balansera detta. Här är en POSITIV nyhet om Wikileaks. Att de ska börja avslöja storföretagen ockjså: http://di.se/Artiklar/2010/12/30/223737/Wikileaks-skiftar-fokus/

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Liberaldemokraterna

Jag är en av grundarna till Liberaldemokraterna.

Men åsikterna på bloggen är mina egna…

Vad är Liberaldemokraterna?

Liberaldemokraternas Facebookgrupp —– Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/Lib_dem

Vår hemsida, som är under byggnad, kommer att finnas på:

www.liberaldemokraterna.com

***

Lägg till Jerlerup på twitter genom att klicka här!

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Läs även andra bloggares åsikter om ,,,

Söndagsreflektion om Julian Assange

The Guardian och DN har tagit fram lite mer av anklagelserna mot Julian Assange. Intressant läsning men jag hoppar till när de säger att det är den fulla anklagelsen. Det motsäger andra rapporter som talar om mer tvång, etc. Nåja, hur som helst får vi väl vänta och se vad som kommer fram under rättegången. Antingen visar sig media ha varit ute och cyklat, eller så är saken, liksom HAX skriver, i praktiken en struntsak. Hur som helst väcker artiklarna en del frågor om vad domstolen kan komma att fokusera på. Kådisar eller tvång och våld?!


Om domstolen skulle fokusera på brustna kådisar och sex utan kådis så må lagen vara skriven hur som helst, men det är helt fel att döma honom, utom om han vet att han har könssjukdom, för då gör han helt fel.

Döms han för att han lurat kvinnor att ha sex utan kådis har han gjort moraliskt sett fel, men varför i helskotta ska man döma honom i domstol för det, man dömer ju inte alla tiotusentals kvinnor som har sex och ”glömmer” P-piller, eller hur?

Jag vet en och annan i min vänskapskrets som har haft sex och låtsats ”glömma” P-piller när de ville bli med barn, HELT mot mannens medgivande. Ska de in i finkan? Ska man döma katolska kvinnor som fuskar med de s.k. ”säkra perioderna” också och blir med barn?

Nej, det ska man inte. Och inte heller då män som inte använder kådis, eller hur?!

Men i berättelserna lyser det igenom något som det lär finnas mer bevis om, nämligen användandet av våld och att Assange ska ha gjort närmanden trots ett klart nej. Som jag ser det står och faller anklagelserna mot Assange på just det, på berättelsen om användning av milt våld (fasthållning bland annat). Är domstolen smart, och åklagaren också, ska de givetvis fokusera på det.

Döms Assange för sex utan kådis är jag en av de första som kommer att protestera mot galenskapen. Döms han för att han använt våld och tvång, trots ett nej rån kvinnan, är det övergrepp och/eller våldtäkt, inget annat. Då har jag inget att tillägga, det ska man dömas för.

Mycket av berättelserna i DN och Guardian är en berättelse om våld och milt våld. Det är förkastligt och olagligt!

Men en sak är säker. Michael Moore har rätt! Dessa anklagelser skulle troligen polisen struntat i om det var en annan person än Julian Assange som var anklagad. Polisen skulle INTE krävt att personen utlämnats från utlandet. Fortfarande skiter polisen ofta i att utreda våldtäktsmisstankar, eller gör det på ett lamt sätt. Varför skulle just detta fall få VIP status och prioriteras. Det vill jag höra åklagarens åsikter om!

PS

Återigen… De två kvinnor som säger sig ha utsatts för övergrepp av Assange har lika stor rätt som Assange att ses som oskyldiga. En del debattörer gör en stor sak av att kvinnorna dröjt att berätta om övergreppen och t.o.m fortsatt arrangera fest och sånt för Assange. Jag har mött många kvinnor som utsatts för våld som agerat så. Det har NOLL med fallet att göra. Alla som gör en stor sak av eventuella sms och festarrangemang och pressrelaser efter tidpunkten för övergreppet visar sin STORA okunskap om hur kvinnor och män som utsatts för övergrepp kan agera. Inlägg som de av Göran Rudling visar på STOR okunskap.

Om det som Göra Rudling, Blogge Bloggelito och andra skriver, stämmer om den ena kvinnans agerande, så är det trovärdigt. Så skulle de själva kanske agera om de skulle våldtas av någon! En del kan kasta ut och anmäla en som begått övergrepp direkt. Andra kan inte det. Det mänskliga psyket är ibland svagt, det är en del av hur det är att vara människa!

Läs dessutom denna sak jag skrev om att mobben mot kvinnorna i Assangefallet skrämmer mig!

Läs mer: Expressen, Expressen, Sds, AB, DN, AB, DN, Svd, Deepedition, Zaramis,Drottningsylt, Gajditza

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Liberaldemokraterna

Jag är en av grundarna till Liberaldemokraterna.

Men åsikterna på bloggen är mina egna…

Vad är Liberaldemokraterna?

Liberaldemokraternas Facebookgrupp —– Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/Lib_dem

Vår hemsida finns här:

www.liberaldemokraterna.com

***

Lägg till Jerlerup på twitter genom att klicka här!

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Läs även andra bloggares åsikter om 


Hur fan tänker Wikileaks? (Israel Shamir, Johannes Wahlström och antisemitismen)

Ni som följer min blogg vet att jag försvarar Wikileaks med näbbar och klor. Men jag har blivit mer och mer medveten om att organisationen har några gigantiska problem och strukturfel. Denna artikel i REASON-magazine om Israel Shamir och Johannes Wahlström, rekommenderas för de som vill veta mer om dessa problem:

http://reason.com/archives/2010/12/14/the-assange-employees/1

Om judehataren och förintelseförnekaren Ahmed Rami hade bjudits in av Wikileaks att representera dem i Sverige hade nog många reagerat. Nu har Wikileaks gjort en av världens främsta antisemiter, Israel Shamir, som är sju resor värre än rami, till deras representant i Ryssland och hans son och medarbetare (!) Johannes Wahlström är den journalist som kommit att representera Wikileaks i Sverige. Han får förhandstips om dokumenten och får skriva fina artiklar i Aftonbladet.

Jag försvarar Wikileaks. Men inser att något är fel… Vad som är fel vet jag inte. men något är fel i Wikileaks, förbannat fel, och det stör och oroar mig!

Läs mer om detta här i denna artikel av mig: https://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/11/12/hur-f-n-tanker-aftonbladet/. Samt i dessa artiklar: Expressen, DN, Jonathan Leman, Jonathan Leman,

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Liberaldemokraterna

Jag är en av grundarna till Liberaldemokraterna.

Men åsikterna på bloggen är mina egna…

Vad är Liberaldemokraterna?

Liberaldemokraternas Facebookgrupp —– Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/Lib_dem

Vår hemsida, som är under byggnad, kommer att finnas på:

www.liberaldemokraterna.com

***

Lägg till Jerlerup på twitter genom att klicka här!

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Läs även andra bloggares åsikter om , samt nyheter: DN, hd, AB, AB, DN, Boströmsamhället,

Skilj mellan Assange och Wikileaks!

Informationskriget är i full gång. Wikileaks servar attackeras och å sin sida har Wikileaks-supportrar börjat attackera myndigheter och banker som motarbetar Wikileaks. Samtidigt har nu Julian Assange hamnat i finkan och hotar med att släppa en domedagsfile med alla hemliga dokument i ocensurerat skick, om något händer med Wikileaks. Vad ska man säga om allt detta?

Jag stöder Wikileaks. Stormakterna  har ställt till en förbannad massa kaos förra seklet och de ska inte känna att de kan göra hur de vill, utan insyn.

Om vi hade haft ett Wikileaks på 20-talet och 30-talet hade kanske diverse ljusskygga spel bakom gallerierna, och kompromissande, avslöjats för allmänheten och det andra världskriget hade kunnat undvikas! ‘

Det är fascinerande att bläddra i de interna dokumenten från brittiska UD och läsa rapporterna om HItlers bok Mein Kampf som ”glömdes bort” på 30-talet. Det är fascinerande att läsa hur brittiska UD och Bank of England skapade en ekonomisk bojkott av de demokratiskat valda ICKE NAZISTISKA regeringarna i Tyskland runt 1930 och hävde bojkotten då nazisterna kom till makten. Det är intressant att läsa de interna regeringsdokumenten i ALLA Europas regeringar om förföljelsen av judarna i Tyskland på 30-talet, som visar att alla tidigt fick veta vad nazisterna höll på med. Etc, etc… Tänk om detta interna smutsiga taskspel hade gjorts offentligt?!

Det är värt att tänka på.

Assange skapade Wikileaks, men Wikileaks är MER än Assange. Döms han, och det kan han göra eftersom en del tyder på att han faktiskt kan ha gjort det som han anklagas för, ska vi inte döma ut Wikileaks.

Wikileaks behövs!

Dessutom

Läs Rick Falkvinges blogginlägg igår om att informationskriget eskalerar.

Saker går vansinnigt fort nu. Igår skrev jag om att höga politiker går ut i media och vill att uppgiftslämnare till media ska skjutas, eller åtminstone lönnmördas. Det är så det går till i Kina och Iran. Och nu även här i Väst.

Idag har det kommit mer, mycket mer av den där “Välkommen till Kina”-känslan. Ett axplock:

Studenter i USA ges ett vänligt råd att inte prata om WikiLeaks med sina vänner om de vill ha jobb efter examen. Rådet kommer inifrån statsförvaltningen. Den sortens subtil skrämsel har jag aldrig någonsin sett i väst tidigare, men den förekommer i… ja, just det. Kina och Iran. Jag skulle kunna skriva en hel uppsats om hur det går kalla kårar när en statstjänsteman antyder, bara antyder på det där sättet att “det kanske går dåligt för dig om du diskuterar det här med vänner och bekanta”.

Schweiz letar efter sätt att stänga WikiLeaks’ bankkonto, utöver att PayPal redan har stängt ett av inflödena.

Australiensisk polis letar efter och funderar på om man kan sätta dit Julian Assange för något brott. (I normalfall går man åt andra hållet: man hittar brottet först och sedan hittar man en gärningsman; att göra tvärtom är att be polisen ta hand om en besvärande person på vilket sätt som helst och har inte i ett rättssamhälle att göra.) De undersöker dessutom möjligheterna att göra honomstatslös genom att göra hans australiensiska pass ogiltigt.

Under tiden har WikiLeaks höjt sina försvarsinsatser och gör det nu enkelt för vem som helst att sätta upp en spegelkopia av hela WikiLeaks, så att sajten distribueras över massor av olika servrar och länder. Sanitarium satte upp steg-för-steg-instruktioner på svenska (och jag har redan satt upp en egen spegel hemma hos mig, det var enkelt). Mindre än 24 timmar efter det arbetet började är WikiLeaks spegelpublicerat fullt ut på över 200 ställen.

Historiska paralleller

Jag brukar ibland säga att allt detta har hänt förut, och allt detta kommer att hända igen. Jag skrev igår att man angriper infrastrukturen för att hindra information och idéer att komma ut (och dagens händelser fortsätter på samma tema, plus att man börjar skrämma människor från att prata om det). En viktig parallell hände under andra världskriget här i Sverige.

Man kunde inte förbjuda tidningar att tryckas, det hade grundlag sett till. På något sätt ville man ändå få stopp på vissa tidningar, framför allt kommunistiska och antinazistiska. De var… besvärande. Det var då som något ljushuvud kom på att man kan förbjuda dem att transporteras på järnväg och väg, även om man inte kan förbjuda själva tryckningen. Då skulle ju idéerna inte komma ut. Det kallades för transportförbud och lagen gällde 1940-1943.

Parallellerna är slående. Man lyckades inte stänga ner obekväma publikationer, utan angrep i stället infrastrukturen från maktens håll. Även responsen är väldigt lik det som händer idag: aktivister kring dessa politiska tidningar, massor av aktivister, byggde snabbt upp ett volontärnätverk för att bygga upp en ny fungerande distribution och bära ut tidningarna på egen volontärkraft. Det fungerade. Angreppet mot infrastrukturen för att tysta idéer misslyckades.

1949 skrevs det in i svensk grundlag att ingen får vägra att transportera en tidning på grund av dess innehåll. Då hade det tidigare angreppet på infrastrukturen fallit i stor skam.

Det gäller att upprepa historien. Det är upp till oss, här och nu, att fortsätta kämpa för en fungerande infrastruktur. Så länge idéerna kan bäras ut, så har de som förespråkar censur ingen chans.

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Liberaldemokraterna

Jag är en av grundarna till Liberaldemokraterna och sitter i styrelsen för (L),

men åsikterna på bloggen är mina egna…

Vad är Liberaldemokraterna?

Liberaldemokraternas Facebookgrupp —– Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/Lib_dem

Liberaldemokraternas hemsida finns här:

www.liberaldemokraterna.com

***

Lägg till Jerlerup på twitter genom att klicka här!

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***

Help support the wikileaks mirrors. Donate your FB and vKontakte status, continuous twitter updates and more to mirroring adresses to wikileaks mirrors! Also let visual space on your blogs and websites for the same purpose. Freedom of speech shall not be quenched! Democracy shall not be silenced!

http://46.59.1.2/mass-mirror.html

http://wikileaks.ch/

http://savewikileaks.net/

Läs även: Amanda Brihed, Lennart Regebro, Martin Ekdahl, Filippu, Oansvarigt, Scaber Nestor, TO, Malin WestbergTegnvallius, Gajditza, Johanna Nylander, HAX, Jinge, Farmor Gun, DN, DN, Opassande, SvdExpressen, AB, AB, AB, SDS,

 

Läs även andra bloggares åsikter om ,HD;

Jag är Wikileaks!

Jag lägger ut två dokument till från Wikileaks idag igen med motiveringen: ”jag är Wikileaks”. Gör samma sak i din blogg, eller starta en ny och gör det där!

Här är en lista över speglar till Wikileaks.


Dessutom, lite Blogg-lovin: Lars-Erick, Farmor Gun, Opassande, Nikke Lindqvist, Amanda Brihed, Scaber Nestor som lagt in ett Wikileaks dokument ,  SvdDNTokmoderatenZaramisFalkvingeABSvdDNHAXRöda BergetBeelzebjörnOpassandeDNDNGothbarbieAnna TrobergAnna,  ABDNFilippucogito, Ekdahl, HAX, Odsvall, Gajditza, ingsoc, Nemokrati, Bibbi, Aftonbladet, AB, Olof B

Viewing cable 09STOCKHOLM194, SWEDEN: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CTIf you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQsReference ID Created Released Classification Origin09STOCKHOLM194 2009-03-20 13:01 2010-12-05 17:05 SECRET Embassy StockholmVZCZCXYZ0008PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHSM #0194 0791327ZNY SSSSS ZZHP 201327Z MAR 09FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLMTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4231S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 000194
SIPDIS  S/CT SHARRI R. CLARK
E.O. 12958:  DECL: 03/20/2019 TAG PTER, PGOV, ASEC, EFIN, ENRG, KCIP, SW
SUBJECT:  SWEDEN: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT
REF: SECSTATE 15113
Classified By: CDA  Robert Silverman for reasons: 1/4 (B), (D), (E), and (G)
¶1. (S) In  response to reftel, post would like to add Sweden’s communications  infrastructure to the CI/KR list.  Although Sweden does not posses a  direct undersea cable from the U.S.,Sweden is a central European  communications hub.  For example, Swedish company TeliaSonera is an  international carrier that owns and manages 43,000 km of fiber optic  cable linking Russia and the Baltics to the rest of Europe and the U.S.   If these lines of communications were to be destroyed, disrupted, or  exploited, it may compromise global communications.
¶2. (S) Post  recommends keeping Swedish pharmaceutical manufacturing company Recip AB  on the CI/KR list for its production of ThyroSafe (potassium iodide).   This resource provides protection in the aftermath of a nuclear  emergency. ThyroSafe is the only FDA approved 65 mg potassium iodide  tablet used to protect the thyroid gland against radioactive iodine  released during a nuclear emergency. SILVERMAN

***

Viewing cable 08BERLIN643, s) germany requests information concerning
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin08BERLIN643 2008-05-16 10:10 2010-12-05 12:12 SECRET Embassy BerlinAppears in these articles:http://www.spiegel.deVZCZCXRO6021PP RUEHDEDE RUEHRL #0643 1371014ZNY SSSSS ZZHP 161014Z MAY 08FM AMEMBASSY BERLINTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1230INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVERUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0151RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0195RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0154RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0105 S e c r e t berlin 000643
Sipdis, isn/mtr, eur/ags and eur/pra
E.o. 12958: decl: 05/16/2033Tags: parm, prel, ettc, mtcre, ksca, ir, gmSubject: (s) germany requests information concerningiranian procurement of xxxxxxxxxxxx test chamber
Ref: a. 07 state 75839b. State 15220c. Berlin 195d. State 40087e. Berlin 511
Classified By: Glbal Affairs Unit Chief Don L. Brown forreasons 14 (b) and (d).
¶1. (u) this is an action request. Please see para 5.
¶2. (S) On May 13, MFA Export Control Division Desk OfficerWiebke Wacker provided Global Affairs Oficer with aGerman-language nonpaper requesting nformation from U.S.concerning an Iranian natioal, xxxxxxxxxxxx, in connection with the Iranianprocurement of a German origin environmental test chamberfrom the firm xxxxxxxxxxxx. In support of acurrent investigation, the Germans are specificallyinterested in knowing whether the USG has any informationindicating that xxxxxxxxxxxx was aware that the Iranianfirm Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG) would be theactual end-user of the environmental test chamber.
¶3. (S) In a May 5 meeting, Wacker provided Global AffairsOfficer with further background information concerning thisinformation request. According to the German Customs Officeof Criminal Investigation (Zollkriminalamt, or ZKA), Wackersaid, xxxxxxxxxxxx was confronted (and possibly detained)by U.S. authorities in February 2008 while applying for avisa at AmConGen Dubai. Wacker said the ZKA has assessedthat information concerning xxxxxxxxxxxx business contacts withxxxxxxxxxxxx is a critical piece of evidence needed tosupport the ZKA’s ongoing investigation into xxxxxxxxxxxxand Iranian efforts to procure an environmentalchamber from xxxxxxxxxxxx.
¶4. (S) Begin informal Embassy translation of German-languagenonpaper:
With reference to the Non-Papers from June 1, 2007, August 3,2007, December 18, 2007, February 15, 2008, and April 21,2008 regarding the procurement of an environmental testchamber by the Iranian xxxxxxxxxxxx from the German xxxxxxxxxxxx via Romania and Croatia, we take this opportunityto ask the U.S. authorities about the following points:
The German export control authorities have learned thatxxxxxxxxxxxx was approached by U.S. authorities aboutthese matters. Because the German authorities have alsoundertaken investigative measures, we are interested ininformation concerning the results of these conversations.
The U.S. authorities reported in their Non Paper from April21, 2008, that the Iranian firm SBIG is the actual intendedrecipient of the test chamber. The German export controlauthorities are accordingly interested in knowing whether theGerman citizen xxxxxxxxxxxx had knowledge of thisend-user.
We thank you for the information in connection with theSBIG’s procurement attempts and we look forward to continuingour excellent cooperation in the area of export controls.
End text of informal Embassy translation.
¶5. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests Department guidancein responding to the questions posed in the German nonpaper.Timken jr

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Liberaldemokraterna

Jag är en av grundarna till Liberaldemokraterna.

Men åsikterna på bloggen är mina egna…

Vad är Liberaldemokraterna?

Liberaldemokraternas Facebookgrupp —– Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/Lib_dem

Vår hemsida finns här:

www.liberaldemokraterna.com

***

Lägg till Jerlerup på twitter genom att klicka här!

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Läs även andra bloggares åsikter om ,HD;

Wikileaks: ”I am Spartacus”

What is needed now is an international campaign to save Wikileaks. It can be done via the method:  ”I Am SPARTACUS”. We can share the links to adresses where we can find the Wikileaks mirrors on the internet, and we can publish some of the documents on our own webbpages. If 100.000 people does this then we can all make a difference! And publish them as documents or pdf:s on public sites too as scribd: http://www.scribd.com/. (For an example of what you can do on scribd: click here: wikileaks.)

Those who can can make a mirror of their own to Wikileaks:

http://46.59.1.2/mass-mirror.html

Or link to mirrors as these two:

http://fringewire.net/

http://savewikileaks.net/another-wikileaks-address/

On these two sites you can find documents that you can copy to your site or blog, or that you simply can post all over the internet. In this way hundreds of thousands of people can say: ”I am Wikileaks”! If possible choose the documents that are classified as SECRET.

http://www.wikileaks.ch

”I am Wikileaks”

Viewing cable 08LONDON1350, HMG RAISES THE BAR ON INTEL FLIGHTS

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08LONDON1350 2008-05-14 15:03 2010-12-02 21:09 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy London

 

VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLO #1350/01 1351506
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141506Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8598
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHLO/USDAO LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0277

 

 

S E C R E T LONDON 001350 

SIPDIS
NOFORN 

STATE FOR U/S ROOD, PM ACTION TEAM AND EUR/WE/UK
OSD FOR USDP EDELMAN
EO 12958 DECL: 04/24/2018
TAGS MARR, MOPS, PINR, PREL, LE, UK
SUBJECT: HMG RAISES THE BAR ON INTEL FLIGHTS
REF: A. STATE-LONDON SVTC MAY 9
 B. LONDON 1159  C. MAY 1 GILLARD-TREMONT LETTER  D. LONDON 1115  E. LONDON 1064  F. TREMONT-PMAT EMAIL APRIL 16

Classified By: DCM Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4, b/d.

1. (S/NF) Summary and Recommendation. FCO contacts explained May 14 that HMG’s May 1 approval (ref C) for CEDAR SWEEP flights had been widely considered at MOD and FCO, with some departments flagging concerns about the information provided by the USG. HMG is concerned that the request for reconnaissance flights may have been made by the Lebanese MOD, rather than the entire GOL. Embassy will be receiving a new letter from HMG setting out that HMG approval for CEDAR SWEEP was based on the understanding that the flights are approved by the entire GOL. Secondly, FCO is concerned that human rights reports, including the State Department’s own, do not reflect the sterling reputation of the LAF as conveyed in our April 14 request for use of Akrotiri airbase. HMG expects the United States to monitor use of the CEDAR SWEEP intel and ensure the LAF lives up to its commitment to maintain high human rights standards. Embassy London is concerned by HMG’s piling on of concerns and conditions, which portend a burdensome process for getting the rest of our intel flights approved, per ref B. We recommend high level approaches to MOD and FCO counterparts to register concern about these new conditions. Embassy Beirut may also want to consider having the GOL engage the British directly. End Summary.

Concerns And/Or Implied Conditions
---------------------------------- 

2. (S/NF) John Hillman of FCO’s Whitehall Liaison Department informed PolMilOff May 14 of several HMG concerns/conditions about CEDAR SWEEP that could jeopardize future use of British territory. First, Hillman said that the FCO regional bureau responsible for Lebanon had questioned USG assurances that the reconnaissance missions were requested by “the Government of Lebanon.” The regional bureau was concerned that the request for reconnaissance assistance may have only been made by the Lebanese Ministry of Defense, rather the entire Lebanese cabinet, which apparently requires consensus on controversial issues. HMG believed the GOL could disavow assertions that it requested reconnaissance assistance if the flights were made public. Hillman said that HMG was “entitled to accept” the USG understanding that MOD was authorized to make the request on behalf of the entire GOL. HMG has sent Embassy London a follow-up letter (not yet received) emphasizing that HMG’s May 1 approval was contingent on the understanding that the request was made by the GOL. Hillman said that, should the GOL disavow the request and it become clear that the entire GOL was not supportive of the flights, HMG would have difficulty approving the involvement of British territory in CEDAR SWEEP.

3. (S/NF) Second, Hillman said the FCO human rights department noted that, despite the Lebanese MOD’s assurances that it would not use the shared intel unlawfully, Human Rights Watch and even the State Department’s own Human Rights Report had documented cases of torture and arbitrary arrest by the LAF. Hillman underscored that if there were any risk that detainees captured with the help of CEDAR SWEEP intel could be tortured, HMG would expect the USG to impress upon the LAF that assurances of lawful treatment must be upheld in practice. Furthermore, Hillman said, to the extent that the USG becomes aware of arrests made as a result of CEDAR SWEEP intel, HMG expects the USG to ensure the detainees are treated lawfully. If the U.S. became aware of “reasons to doubt LAF assurances,” HMG would expect to be notified immediately. Hillman noted that these human rights considerations would undoubtedly be reviewed in the next Cedar Sweep approval cycle.

Comment and Recommendation
-------------------------- 

4. (S/NF) Hillman emphasized that the decision to approve CEDAR SWEEP had been widely discussed in MOD and FCO, with the decision made by Minister Kim Howells, but even Foreign Secretary had been informed. He noted that “the highly cautious approach is a reflection of Parliamentary, public, and media attention to issues involving UK complicity in human rights violations.”

5. (S/NF) Embassy London finds these additional conditions for HMG approval and assumptions about our ability to monitor every CEDAR SWEEP-related apprehension to be not only burdensome but unrealistic. We recommend that DOD and State officials raise with UK counterparts the concern that excessive conditions such as described above will hinder, if not obstruct, our cooperative counterterrorism efforts. While we share HMG’s concerns that human rights not be sacrificed for the sake of CT, we cannot take a risk-avoidance approach to CT in which the fear of potentially violating human rights allows terrorism to proliferate in Lebanon. We also recommend that Embassy Beirut consider whether it would help to have the urge the GOL engage the British directly. HMG is supportive of the Siniora government and may be less rigid if asked to assist by the Siniora government itself. Visit London’s Classified Website: http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom TUTTLE

 

Viewing cable 09KABUL165, CENTCOM COMMANDER PETRAEUS JAN 20 MEETING WITH

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL165 2009-01-23 07:07 2010-12-02 21:09 SECRET Embassy Kabul

 

O 230734Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6962
INFO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

 

 

S E C R E T KABUL 000165 

EO 12958 DECL: 01/22/2019
TAGS PINR, PREL, PTER, AF
SUBJECT: CENTCOM COMMANDER PETRAEUS JAN 20 MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT KARZAI

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, U.S. Embassy Kabul, Reasons:  1.4 (B and D)

Summary
------- 

1.(S) On January 20, CENTCOM Commander Petraeus, accompanied by Ambassador Wood and CENTCOM staff, met with President Karzai and his senior National Security staff.

India/Pakistan
-------------- 

2.(S) Petraeus asked Karzai to urge India not to curtail its cooperation with Pakistan. India would never have more positive Pakistani leadership than Zardari, Gailani, Kiayani, and Pasha and, in spite of the difficulties, now was the time to try to make progress in the relationship. Karzai said the U.S. should urge China to press Pakistan, over whom they had great influence, to cooperate with Afghanistan and with India. He noted that the Indians were prepared to offer Afghanistan light attack helicopters. A short discussion followed highlighting the adverse reaction in Pakistan to Indian provision of military equipment to Afghanistan.

Civilian Casualties and Afghan Participation in Special Ops
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 

3.(S) President Karzai raised the civilian casualty issue. Petraeus assured him that the U.S. was taking every step to minimize civilian casualties for both humane and policy reasons. He noted the importance of the new tactical directive. Petraeus cited recent reports by the respected Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission that clearly put the onus on the terrorists for civilian casualties, although it also called for more thorough and transparent investigation of allegations by the coalition.

4.(S) Petraeus noted that the increase of 30,000 U.S. troops next year would also increase combat, leading to the possibility of increased civilian casualties in the short term. President Karzai asked if we really knew who we were fighting. Petraeus was categorical that we had confidence in our intelligence and believed we knew who the enemy was. Karzai said that Afghans were suspicious of the U.S. because of the situation in Helmand. &The tribes must back you,8 he said, and that does not mean recreating tribal militias.

5.(S) Petraeus noted that Karzai had not acted on our request for 100 Afghans to accompany our special operations forces on night raids. Karzai argued that 100 Afghans would not give Afghanistan meaningful control over the operation but would force them to take responsibility when a mistake was made. He promised to study the issue further and called for greater Afghan participation in both the selection of targets and the implementation of operations. Petraeus suggested that on a pilot project basis we might consider putting more Afghans with one of our special strike forces so that they could in reality conduct the operation. He emphasized the importance that the U.S. should remain in a position to conduct after-action site exploitation for intelligence purposes.

6.(S) Karzai raised the issue of the use of dogs in house raids. He said it was unacceptable in the Afghan culture and was used by Taliban propaganda to undermine support for the coalition and the government. Interior Minister Atmar, with Karzai’s support, argued that if Afghans were allowed to be “first through the door,” they we prepared to run the risk of not using dogs in order to respect cultural sensitivities.

Afghan Taliban
-------------- 

7.(S) Karzai raised the Quetta Shura. He said that Afghans didn’t understand why the U.S was making such an effort inside of Afghanistan, but was failing to go after the Taliban in Quetta. They thought either “the U.S. has been deceived by Pakistan” or “there was some secret deal” not to go after the Quetta Shura “because Pakistan was more important to the U.S. than Afghanistan.” He stressed the need to be able to go back to the Afghan people and make it clear that the U.S. was serious about defeating Afghanistan’s enemies.

8.(S) Petraeus assured Karzai that we considered the Afghan Taliban an important enemy which we were confronting in every way we could. He underlined our vital national interest in preventing global terrorism from ever again using Afghanistan as a launching pad. Karzai nodded affirmatively throughout the General’s presentation and said that the people of Afghanistan wanted to see more clearly that the U.S. would not allow Afghanistan to be a base for terrorism again.

Relations with New Administration
---------------------------------- 

9.(S) Karzai raised recent critical statements attributed to Senator Clinton, but said he was enthusiastic about his relationship with her. Karzai stressed the need for us to address frankly our problems with each other and respond seriously to the concerns of each side. He praised the visit of Secretary Gates shortly after the Shindand incident in August and said that the visit had served to completely defuse the Shindand incident.

10.(S) Early in the discussion, Petraeus said that he would be returning to Washington for a first meeting with President Obama, and offered to convey a message from Karzai. Karzai returned to the message throughout the discussion, highlighting the need for mutual respect and cooperation, the need to resolve the civilian casualties issue and increase Afghan participation in special operations, and a tougher line on sanctuaries in Pakistan.

2009
---- 

11.(S) In conclusion, Karzai said that 2009 would be a difficult and important year. Additional troops would make a big difference. Successful elections would be crucial.

Other Comments
-------------- 

12.(S) Karzai then invited other Afghan participants at the table to make comments. Minister of Defense Wardak called for increased coordination in the battle space, especially with the proliferation of the additional forces and additional players. He also argued for the eventual further increase of the National Army beyond the planned 134,000.

13.(S) Foreign Minister Spanta expressed concern about the “fragmentation” of the international community and urged the U.S. to play a more active role in making development assistance more coherent. He said that the target should not simply be to rebuild Afghanistan but to genuinely increase aid effectiveness.

14.(S) Minister of Interior Atmar said that it was important that our two constituencies -- the Afghan public and the U.S. public -- be able to see the two allies united and able to solve problems between them. He said there was still strong support for the American presence. He stressed the need: (1) to strengthen Afghan government institutions including the police, (2) to make clear that the U.S. cares for the wellbeing of Afghan citizens, and (3) to take meaningful action against the sanctuaries against the Taliban in Pakistan.

15.(S) NDS Director Saleh simply noted the need for a larger NDS and asked for U.S. support.
WOOD

 

Viewing cable 08STATE116943, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE116943 2008-11-03 18:06 2010-12-04 18:06 SECRET//NOFORN Secretary of State

 

ORIGIN DS-00    

INFO  LOG-00   MFA-00   EEB-00   AF-00    AIT-00   A-00     CIAE-00
      INL-00   DNI-00   DODE-00  DOEE-00  WHA-00   EAP-00   DHSE-00
      EUR-00   OIGO-00  OBO-00   TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    JUSE-00
      LAB-01   L-00     MMP-00   MOFM-00  MOF-00   NEA-00   DCP-00
      ISN-00   NSCE-00  NSF-01   OES-00   OIG-00   P-00     ISNE-00
      DOHS-00  FMPC-00  SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    DPM-00
      USSS-00  NCTC-00  CBP-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-00   SCA-00
      SAS-00   FA-00      /002R

P 031812Z NOV 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO SECURITY OFFICER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
INFO AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY
XMT AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG

 

 

S E C R E T STATE 116943

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: MR
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY

Classified By: Derived from Multiple Sources

SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//MR
Declassify on: Source marked 25X1-human, Date of source:
October 30, 2008

1. (U) Diplomatic Security Daily, November 1-3, 2008

2. (U) Significant Events ) Paragraphs 7-13

3. (U) Key Concerns ) Paragraphs 14-18

4. (U) Threats & Analysis ) Paragraphs 19-31

5. (U) Cyber Threats ) Paragraphs 32-45

6. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents ) Paragraphs 46-49

7. (U) Significant Events

8. (SBU) EUR - Ireland - Emergency Action Committee (EAC)
Belfast met October 31 to discuss the armed forces homecoming
parade scheduled for November 2 and the planned simultaneous
counter-demonstrations by Sinn Fein and the dissident
republican group Eirigi. Discussions centered on the parade
route and the possibility of confrontations and violence in
different areas, as well as the presence of AmCits along the
parade and demonstration routes. The EAC decided the U.S.
Consulate General should release a Warden Message to warn
AmCits in Belfast. (Belfast 0137)

9. (SBU) Sweden - Approximately 12 to 15 protesters, carrying
banners and flags requesting fair treatment for the &Cuban
Five8 in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, made an unscheduled
appearance at U.S. Embassy Stockholm November 1. The group
emerged from the nearby German Embassy and stopped briefly in
front of Post. The RSO monitored the group; they did not
attempt to contact Embassy officials, but appeared more
interested in photographing the front of Post. The protesters
departed within a few minutes before Embassy police could
respond. No damages or injuries were reported. (RSO Stockholm
Spot Report)

10. (S//NF) NEA - Egypt - EAC Cairo convened October 20 to
review recent threat reporting and access any threats
specific to the planned visit by U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice on November 8 and 9. The EAC agreed there is
no new, specific, and/or credible threat to U.S. interests in
Egypt, but also assessed that Egypt remains a very tempting
target for both indigenous and transnational terrorist
elements. EAC members also agreed to enhance security
measures at the American Presence Post in Alexandria. The EAC
continues to assess the Government of Egypt,s (GoE)
counterterrorism efforts as effective, and Post has a close
relationship with the GoE on security matters. (Appendix 1)

11. (S//NF) Kuwait - EAC Kuwait City convened November 2 to
discuss the security impact of recent threat reporting,
Embassy Kuwait election coverage, U.S. Marine Corps Birthday
Ball, and the upcoming visit of the former U.S. President
William J. Clinton. The EAC was briefed on the recent
reporting of possible terrorist surveillance of housing areas
within Kuwait City. Post is coordinating the release of this
information to the Kuwait Security Service for further
action. The RSO stated the Local Guard Force (LGF) Mobile
Patrol unit will increase coverage in the housing occupied by
Chief of Mission personnel within the named areas, defensive
counterintelligence training with be given to locally
employed staff, and a Security Notice reminding personnel to
remain vigilant in their personal security procedures will be
released. The EAC concluded that Post,s current security
posture is appropriate for the planned events. (Appendix 2)

12. (S//NF) EAP - Indonesia - EAC Jakarta convened October 30
to discuss the security implications of the anticipated
execution of the Bali bombers. The Government of Indonesia
(GoI) recently announced they would be executed during the
first week of November. Rumors are circulating around Jakarta
that retaliatory attacks and demonstrations by those who
support the bombers are possible. However, there is no
specific or credible information regarding the planning of
these types of attacks. One report mentioned possible suicide
bomber attacks on shopping malls in Jakarta, specifically the
Kelapa Gading mall in northern Jakarta, but without details.
The U.S. Embassy assesses the likelihood of a terrorist
attack conducted against U.S. or other Western interests in
direct response to the executions is low. (Appendix source 3)

13. (SBU) SCA - Pakistan - A motorcade carrying Pakistani
Deputy Inspector General of Police Syed Akhtar Ali Shah was
targeted by a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device (IED) attack in Marden Province on October 31 at
around 2:30 p.m. Ali Shah and 20 others were wounded, and
nine police officers were killed in the attack. On November
1, at approximately 2:33 a.m., an explosion occurred at a
police substation approximately 2,000 meters from the U.S.
Consulate Peshawar residential area and official annexes. One
police officer was killed and several other individuals were
badly wounded. It is undetermined at this time whether the
explosion was from a rocket or an explosion charge placed at
the structure. The RSO will monitor these attacks. (RSO
Peshawar Spot Report)

14. (U) Key Concerns

15. (S//FGI//NF) NEA - Lebanon - Al-Qa,ida affiliate to
attack U.S. Embassy motorcade: According to a source of the
Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate, as of
mid-October, al-Qa,ida-affiliated elements in the Ayn
al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp plan to attack a U.S.
Embassy motorcade in Beirut. The men planning the operation
had already collected an unspecified amount of explosives and
a white 1983 Mercedes, which was currently inside the Shatila
Palestinian refugee camp. The Mercedes was to be rigged with
the explosives. (Appendix source 4)

16. (S//FGI//NF) SCA - Maldives - Continued monitoring of
al-Qa,ida associates: The Maldives Police Service continued
to investigate and monitor the activities of Maldives-based
al-Qa,ida associates Yoosuf Izadhy, Easa Ali, and Hasnain
Abdullah Hameedh (a.k.a. Hameed). Izadhy was reportedly in
contact with a militant group in Waziristan, which allegedly
maintained unspecified links to al-Qa,ida. Izadhy was
clandestinely working to recruit others into his
organization, specifically seeking individuals who had
undergone basic terrorism training in Pakistan. Izadhy
planned to create a terrorist group in the Maldives with the
assistance of the Waziristan-based group. Izadhy planned to
send his members to Waziristan for training. Hameedh was in
close contact with a number of individuals who had undergone
training in Pakistan, including individuals who were members
of Jamaat-ul Muslimeen and completed basic and advanced
training by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) in Pakistan. They followed
the ideology of Abu Easa.

17. (S//FGI//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes, while the operational
aspirations of Yoosuf Izadhy (Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment (TIDE) number 17312323), Easa Ali (TIDE number
17312652), and Hasnain Abdullah Hameedh (TIDE number
20686145) are unclear; past reporting suggests Maldivian
extremists have demonstrated interest in actively
participating in global jihadi activities by attempting to
arrange travel and terrorist training in Pakistan. While many
Maldivian participants of extremist online forums aimed to
ultimately fight Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,
mid-October 2007 debrief information following the September
29 bombing in Male that targeted tourists indicates at least
two of the operatives participated in the attack in exchange
for travel from the islands after the operation and arranged
study at a madrassa in Pakistan.

18. (S//NF) Specific links to al-Qa,ida remain unclear;
although, reporting from May detailed recruitment activity by
Maldivian national Ahmed Zaki of Maldivians into the Kashmiri
extremist group LT madrassas and training camps in Pakistan.
A variety of reports from 2006 details linkages between
Maldivians belonging to a group known as
Jama-ah-tul-Muslimeen (JTM) and individuals participating in
an anti-American Islamic extremist online forum called Tibyan
Publications. JTM is an extremist group based in the UK that
follows an extremist ideology known as Takfiir that actively
encourages violent jihad and supports criminality against
apostate states. (Appendix sources 5-18)

19. (U) Threats & Analysis

20. (S//NF) WHA - Mexico - Violence spikes again in Tijuana:
According to a mid-level Baja California state police
official, a turf war between the Arellano Felix Organization
(AFO) and the Sinaloa Cartel has caused another increase in
violence in Tijuana. The Mexican Government,s
counternarcotics efforts -- in the form of 3,300 military and
police assets patrolling the area under Operation Tijuana --
have severely weakened the AFO,s operations. The Sinaloa
Cartel, hoping to capitalize on the AFO,s weaknesses, is
battling for control of Tijuana,s drug plaza. While the AFO
assassins are skilled, Sinaloa Cartel hit men are poorly
trained and have no aversion to public shootings; however, if
the Sinaloa Cartel successfully ousts the AFO from Tijuana,
DS/TIA/ITA notes the levels of violence should decrease.
While residents and visitors are not being targeted, the
likelihood of being in the wrong place at the wrong time is
of increasing concern. Cartel targets are being killed during
daytime hours in public areas of Tijuana, including
restaurants, shopping centers, and near school buildings. The
DoS, Travel Alert for Mexico was extended for six months on
October 14 to reflect the current and widely reported crime
and violence occurring throughout Mexico. (Open sources;
Appendix sources 19-20)

21. (U) AF - Cameroon - An examination of the background,
goals, and tactics of the Niger Delta Defense and Security
Council and the Bakassi Freedom Fighters: (S//NF) The October
31 kidnapping of approximately 10 hostages off the shores of
the Bakassi Peninsula has magnified the role of two groups --
the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF) and the Niger Delta
Defense and Security Council (NDDSC) -- in the increasing
insecurity in the Bakassi. The kidnappings, an overview of
the NDDSC,s and BFF,s background, and an examination of
their past operations, highlight the groups, possible intent
to use novel, deadly, and unprecedented tactics to achieve
their goals.

22. (SBU) In the early morning of October 31, a group of
armed men in three boats attacked a French Total vessel named
Bourbon Sagita, which was located off the Cameroonian shore
between Bakassi and Limbe. Although no Americans were
directly impacted, at least seven French citizens, one
Tunisian, one Senegalese, and several Cameroonian nationals
were kidnapped; five remaining oil workers were left on the
boat. Nobody was injured in the attack.

23. (SBU) According to unconfirmed media reports, shortly
after the raid, the BFF, part of a larger and shadowy
alliance of the NDDSC, claimed responsibility for the attacks
and threatened to kill the hostages, stating, &The 10 are in
our hands. If you don,t tell the government of Cameroon to
come here and discuss with us, we will kill them all in three
days.8 On November 1, the NDDSC/BFF withdrew the threat, but
stated it would hold the hostages until the government opened
negotiations with them.

24. (S//NF) The NDDSC/BFF is likely referring to discussions
over the status of the Bakassi Peninsula in its statement.
The region was transferred from Nigeria to Cameroon on August
14, per an International Court of Justice ruling. According
to e-mails it sent to media outlets, the NDDSC/BFF merged
into an official alliance at the end of July in an attempt to
forestall the hand over. Led by Commander Ebi Dari and
General A.G. Dasuo, who claim they are fighting for
&self-determination and freedom8 of the Bakassi Peninsula
which contains a majority of Nigerian citizens. They are also
demanding that two of their fighters captured in July be
released and that Nigerians on the Bakassi Peninsula be
compensated.

25. (S//NF) An intelligence and open media search of the BFF
provided negligible results. Meanwhile, although little
background information is known about the NDDSC, it claims to
have approximately 1,050 fighters. It has been in existence
since at least 2002 and previously conducted low-level
attacks against Cameroonian troops on the Bakassi. It can
also be linked to three deadly operations prior to the hand
over of the controversial region. In the most macabre raid,
on June 9, the NDDSC allegedly killed and mutilated six
members of a Cameroonian delegation visiting the Peninsula,
including the deputy subregional commander. It also claimed
responsibility for a November 2007 raid on a Cameroonian
military outpost which killed 21 soldiers; this claim remains
unconfirmed. (Please see the July 26 DS Daily for further
information on the pre-hand over security incidents in the
Bakassi.)

26. (S//NF) Although the post-hand over period has been
defined by a series of attacks, the NDDSC/BFF has released
statements denying culpability in some of those operations.
These include a September 28 bank robbery in Limbe and a
September 13 attack against a trawler off the Bakassi
Peninsula. The NDDSC/BFF may be responsible for some
post-hand over operations, while others may have been
conducted by different militants in the region, including in
the Niger Delta. Despite similar tactics in all these
operations, including the use of speedboats carrying heavily
armed masked men, at this time, there are no clear
indications the NDDSC/BFF has a defined relationship with the
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) or
any other prominent Niger Delta group.

27. (S//NF) Instead, the series of raids by the NDDSC/BFF may
possibly signify new tactics being pursued in the Bakassi
region. In its early raids, the NDDSC/BFF primarily used
deadly and brutal force against the Cameroonian military, but
often spared expatriates and civilians. Two recent attacks,
however -- the June 9 attack and the October 31
hostage-taking operation -- have demonstrated its desire to
expand its targets. In the June 6 raid, the NDDSC targeted a
political delegation and mutilated a deputy subregional
commander, the equivalent of a governor. It is unclear if the
NDDSC was directly targeting the governor; but, nevertheless,
the group demonstrated its desire to also kill politicians.
For its part, the October 31 attacks was the first kidnapping
of expatriates off the coast of Cameroon.

28. (S//NF) Also of concern is the NDDSC/BFF,s intent to
hold hostages indefinitely after initially threatening to
kill them. Whereas MEND and other Delta groups kidnapped
hostages primarily to garner ransom money or to force oil
companies to scale back operations, they had seldom directly
harmed or threatened to kill hostages. They also often
released hostages shortly after their capture. Moreover,
given its intent to hold the hostages for a political
objective, the NDDSC/BFF may find it convenient to continue
operations against expatriates in the region to pressure the
Cameroonian Government and to ensure that its political
demands are met. (Open sources; Yaound 1071; 0754; 0706;
Appendix sources 21-28)

29. (S//FGI//NF) SCA - Bangladesh - Rejection of IDP to
register for December elections: As of late October, the
Bangladeshi Election Commission was set to reject the Islamic
Democratic Party,s (IDP,s) attempt to register for the
December parliamentary elections. The IDP is a nascent
political party formed by senior members of the Islamic
terrorist group Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh
(HUJI-B). Bangladesh,s Directorate General of Forces
Intelligence (DGFI) supported the formation of the IDP as a
way to bring HUJI-B into the mainstream and reported it
tightly monitored the group,s activities; although, HUJI-B
has never renounced the use of violence to implement its
vision of transforming Bangladesh into a Muslim theocracy.
According to U.S. Embassy Dhaka, which strongly opposed the
creation of the IDP, the party and its leadership will likely
be angered by the decision and may respond with violence
possibly against the commission or the U.S. Mission or
interests.

30. (S//NF) Arrests and monitoring have undoubtedly hindered
HUJI-B,s capabilities in recent years, and it is entirely
plausible the group is pursuing the creation of a political
wing to improve its ability to support and carry out
terrorist activity. A late-September assessment from
Bangladesh,s National Security Intelligence Organization
(NSI) voiced concern that the party,s creation would free
extremists to pursue extremist activity under the cover of a
moderate front organization. Indeed, there are no indications
IDP would garner a significant number of votes. Analysis from
the DoS, Office of Research noted the majority of
Bangladeshis want Awami League and Bangladesh National Party
leaders Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia to participate in the
December elections. Interestingly, 80 percent stated they
would ignore a call by either party to boycott the vote.
One-third further stated they would join street protests in
the face of a cancellation of elections.

31. (S//FGI//NF) Although there is little information
available regarding HUJI-B,s current capabilities, its
membership likely does retain the ability to manufacture and
use explosives and has previously favored targeting
high-profile individuals for attack. While there is no
specific reporting at the present time detailing plots
against U.S. interests in Bangladesh, the group has publicly
articulated its anti-Western and -Indian stance, including
signing Usama Bin Ladin,s 1998 fatwa against the West. In
regards to HUJI-B,s capabilities, DGFI,s, Rapid Action
Battalion,s (RAB,s), and NSI,s assessments vary
significantly. Following the early-March U.S. designation of
HUJI-B as a foreign terrorist organization, RAB assessed
HUJI-B would not respond with violence due to the severe
degradation of the group,s capability and leadership
structure from arrests and active surveillance. Some member
who wanted to independently attack Western interests,
however, remained technically capable of carrying out
low-level attacks using small arms, grenades, and IEDs. DGFI
likewise reported HUJI-B was &an organization on the run8
and that it did not pose a threat to U.S. interests in
Bangladesh. NSI conversely assessed HUJI-B would react
violently to the designation and would attempt to conduct an
attack against the U.S. official presence in Dhaka; although,
there was no information available detailing such an
operation. Thus far, HUJI-B has not carried out an attack
against American interests in Bangladesh, but the group has
been linked to assassination attempts on intellectuals,
journalists, and politicians, including two thwarted attempts
on the life of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina during public
addresses and a grenade attack that injured the British high
commissioner in May 2004. (&Bangladeshis have high hopes for
national elections,8 DoS Office of Research; Appendix
sources 29-40)

32. (U) Cyber Threats

33. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) WHA - CTAD comment: On October 16,
at least one e-mail account within the Government of Canada
received a Trojanized message from a Yahoo account claiming
to represent a U.S. embassy. The bogus subject line was an
invitation for a private meeting with a named DoS employee.
The attached Microsoft Word document was a malicious
&invitation8 file that, when opened, attempts to beacon and
create a connection to &jingl.cable.nu8 via port 8080. The
&cable.nu8 domain remains one of concern, as it has
historically been associated with activity from Chinese
hacker organizations.

34. (U) EUR - CTAD comment: The European Commission (EC) this
week proposed legislation to establish a Critical
Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN) to improve
information sharing among European Union (EU) member nations.
The proposed legislation would enable the EC to launch and
manage the CIWIN, a secure information technology (IT) system
aimed at sharing knowledge on threats, vulnerabilities, and
protection of critical infrastructures. The CIWIN would be a
voluntary tool for transmitting sensitive information and
would also include a rapid alert system for critical
infrastructure, allowing EU nations to post alerts on
immediate threats.

35. (U) AF - CTAD comment: Sudanese law enforcement recently
reported the arrest of three hackers who have allegedly
attacked more than 300 government and public websites during
the last few months. Among the hacked sites was that of the
National Telecommunication Corporation, which is responsible
for oversight of telecommunication service providers as well
as many other aspects of Sudanese IT and network stability.
The three highly skilled hackers, all of whom are Sudanese,
reportedly caused significant damage to their targets, but
their motivation for the attacks and any potential group
affiliations are yet undetermined.

36. (C) NEA - CTAD comment: On October 21, officials from the
Kuwaiti Central Agency for Information (CAIT) and the
National Security Bureau (NSB) expressed concerns for foreign
and domestic threats to Kuwaiti information systems.
According to these organizations, some of the issues plaguing
Government of Kuwait (GoK) networks are suspected attacks
from Iranian hackers, insider corruption and misuse of
resources, and a lack of sufficient interagency coordination
and guidance for monitoring users, activities and
investigating incidents. For example, the groups, inability
to adequately examine malicious software (malware) injections
or internal abuse of system access continues to hinder the
GoK,s capacity to ensure the protection of sensitive
information. Therefore, the CAIT and NSB are interested in
learning more about U.S. cyber security programs as well as
receiving additional training and support.

37. (S//NF) EAP - CTAD comment: Between September 29 and
October 2, a conference was held by the German Federal Office
for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). During this
conference, the BfV delivered a briefing on its analysis of
the cyber threat posed by the People,s Republic of China
(PRC), which appears to mirror conclusions drawn by the U.S.
Intelligence Community. The BfV surmises the intention of PRC
actors is espionage, and the primary attack vector used in
their malicious activity is socially engineered e-mail
messages containing malware attachments and/or embedded links
to hostile websites. According to reporting, &from October
2006 to October 2007, 500 such e-mail operations were
conducted against a wide range of German organizations,8 and
the attacks appear to be increasing in scope and
sophistication. The socially engineered e-mail messages
delivered to German computer systems were spoofed to appear
to come from trusted sources and contain information
&targeted specifically to the recipient,s interests,
duties, or current events.8 This malicious activity has
targeted a wide variety of German organizational levels to
include &German military, economic, science and technology,
commercial, diplomatic, research and development, as well as
high-level government (ministry and chancellery) systems.8
In addition, German intelligence reporting indicates an
increase in activity was detected immediately preceding
events such as German Government, or commercial, negotiations
involving Chinese interests.

38. (U) SCA - CTAD comment: The National Science Foundation
and the Pakistan Higher Education Commission recently
announced the establishment of a Pakistan extension to an
international high-speed network already connecting U.S. and
EC systems. The new portion of the network links Pakistani
scientists and students to facilities in the U.S. through
additional connections to Singapore and Japan. This project
emerged from February 2007 discussions of the U.S.-Pakistan
Joint Committee on Science and Technology that sought to
promote cooperation and innovation among education and
business sectors. (Open sources; Appendix sources 41-43)

39. (S//NF) Worldwide - BC conducting CNE on USG systems:

40. (S//NF) Key highlights:
BC actively targets USG and other organizations via
socially engineered e-mail messages.
BC actors recently compromised the systems of a U.S. ISP
to carry out CNE on a USG network.
Additional IP addresses were identified this month as
compromised and used for BC activity.
BC has targeted DoS networks in the past and may again in
the future via spoofed e-mail.

41. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Source paragraph: &Byzantine
Candor (BC) actors have compromised multiple systems located
at a U.S. Internet service provider (ISP) and have used the
systems as part of BC,s U.S.-based attack infrastructure
since at least March, targeting multiple victims including at
least one USG agency.8

42. (S//NF) CTAD comment: Since late 2002, USG organizations
have been targeted with social-engineering online attacks by
BC actors. BC, an intrusion subset of Byzantine Hades
activity, is a series of related computer network intrusions
affecting U.S. and foreign systems and is believed to
originate from the PRC. BC intruders have relied on
techniques including exploiting Windows system
vulnerabilities and stealing login credentials to gain access
to hundreds of USG and cleared defense contractor systems
over the years. In the U.S., the majority of the systems BC
actors have targeted belong to the U.S. Army, but targets
also include other DoD services as well as DoS, Department of
Energy, additional USG entities, and commercial systems and
networks. BC actors typically gain initial access with the
use of highly targeted socially engineered e-mail messages,
which fool recipients into inadvertently compromising their
systems. The intruders then install malware such as
customized keystroke-logging software and command-and-control
(C&C) utilities onto the compromised systems and exfiltrate
massive amounts of sensitive data from the networks. This
month, BC actors attempted to compromise the network of a
U.S. political organization via socially engineered e-mail
messages (see CTAD Daily Read File dated October 16).

43. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) CTAD comment: Also discovered this
month by USG analysts was the compromise of several computer
systems located at a commercial ISP within the United States.
According to Air Force Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI) reporting, hackers based in Shanghai and linked to
the PRC,s People,s Liberation Army (PLA) Third Department
have been using these compromised systems as part of the
larger BC attack infrastructure to facilitate computer
network exploitation (CNE) of U.S. and foreign information
systems. Since March, the responsible actors have used at
least three separate systems at the unnamed ISP in multiple
network intrusions and have exfiltrated data via these
systems, including data from at least one USG agency. AFOSI
reporting indicates, on March 11, BC actors gained access to
one system at the ISP, onto which the actors transferred
multiple files, including several C&C tools. From here, the
intruders used the tools to obtain a list of usernames and
password hashes for the system. Next, on April 22, BC actors
accessed a second system at the ISP, where they transferred
additional software tools. From April through October 13, the
BC actors used this computer system to conduct CNE on
multiple victims. During this time period, the actors
exfiltrated at least 50 megabytes of e-mail messages and
attached documents, as well as a complete list of usernames
and passwords from an unspecified USG agency. Additionally,
multiple files were transferred to the compromised ISP system
from other BC-associated systems that have been previously
identified collecting e-mail messages from additional
victims. The third system at the U.S. ISP was identified as
compromised on August 14, when BC actors transferred a
malicious file onto it named
&salaryincrease-surveyandforecast.zip.8 According to AFOSI
analysis, BC actors use this system to host multiple webpages
that allow other BC-compromised systems to download malicious
files or be redirected to BC C&C servers.

44. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CTAD comment: Additional DoD
reporting this month indicates BC actors have used multiple
other systems to conduct CNE against U.S. and foreign systems
from February through September. A October 23 DoD cable
states Shanghai-based hackers associated with BC activity and
linked to the PLA have successfully targeted multiple U.S.
entities during this time period. The cable details dozens of
identified Internet Protocol (IP) addresses associated with
BC activity as well as the dates of their activity. All of
the IP addresses listed resolve to the CNC Group Shanghai
Province Network in Shanghai, and all the host names of the
addresses contained Asian keyboard settings as well as China
time zone settings. Most of these IP addresses were
identified as responsible for direct CNE of U.S. entities,
including unspecified USG organizations, systems and
networks. Interestingly, although the actors using each IP
address practiced some degree of operational security to
obfuscate their identities, one particular actor was
identified as lacking in these security measures. On June 7,
the BC actor, using an identified IP address, was observed
using a Taiwan-based online bulletin board service for
personal use.

45. (S//NF) CTAD comment: BC actors have targeted the DoS in
the past on multiple occasions with socially engineered
e-mail messages containing malicious attached files and have
successfully exfiltrated sensitive information from DoS
unclassified networks. As such, it is possible these actors
will attempt to compromise DoS networks in the future. As BC
activity continues across the DoD and U.S., DoS personnel
should practice conscientious Internet and e-mail use and
should remain informed on BH activity. (Appendix sources
44-46)

46. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents

47. (SBU) EUR - Azerbaijan - A vehicle with Iranian license
plates was parked adjacent to U.S. Embassy Baku October 29.
The driver was the only occupant in the car. Another subject
appeared and got into the car, which then took off. The
police have been asked to check the vehicle registration.
Post is awaiting the results. (SIMAS Event: Baku-00507-2008)

48. (SBU) EAP - Taiwan - An Asian male with a professional
video camera stood across the street from the American
Institute in Taiwan (AIT) October 29. He filmed a number of
buildings in the area and possibly the AIT. After a few
minutes, the subject departed the area on a motor scooter.
(SIMAS Event: Taipei-00194-2008)

49. (SBU) Taiwan - An Asian male stood in front of the Bank
of Taiwan and photographed various buildings -- including the
AIT -- on October 31. An LGF member stopped and questioned
the man, who refused to show identification or the pictures
he took. He left the area on foot shortly afterward. (SIMAS
Event: Taipei-00195-2008)

SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//MR
Full Appendix with sourcing available upon request.
RICE

 

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Div. . . . .

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”Keep your eyes on the ball…”

Keep your eyes on the ball, always on the ball…  Det är ingen slump att underrättelsetjänster ofta pratar i fotbollstermer när de betonar vikten av fokus. Fotbollsspelarna ska alltid ha fokus på bollen. Men hur ska man som observatör veta var bollen är? Jo, följ flödet på fotbollsplanen, var är spelarna just nu och vart riktas deras energi!

Bollen ifråga är det hemliga underrättelsespelet. Det finns ett sånt. Man behöver inte ha foliehatt på sig för att se det.

Men så vidare hemligt har det inte visat sig vara genom historien. Eller hur? I demokratier kan man alltid följa vart bollen är genom att följa spelet på fotbollsplanen.

Keep your eyes on the ball!

På 40-talet satte USA igång Operation Manhattan. Atombomben skulle konstrueras. Men det var ingen hemlighet att man drog igång civil kärnkraft…

På 50-talet och fram till  i praktiken än idag har Sverige varit hemlig medlem av NATO. Men det var inte heller en hemlighet under det kalla kriget, egentligen. Vårt vapensamarbete riktades västerut och våra flygplatser jordes tillgängöliga för andra flygplan än Viggen med sin minimala startsträcka. Dessutom kallade även USA:s presidenter oss för ”the neutral ally” offentligt.

Vi hade det hemliga Stay Behind här, den motståndsrörelse som skulle aktiveras vid krig mot Sovjet, och vi hade åsiktsregistrerig av kommunister. Inte så hemligt heller… Minst av allt för de åsiktsregistrerade.

På 80-talet var inte Sveriges hemliga krutsmuggling till både Iran och Irak under Boforssskandalen så hemlig. Detaljerna visste man inte, men ATT nåt galet skedde med regeringen Palmes godkännande var ganska uppenbart. Högteknologiska produkter såldes ju till både Iran och Irak med regeringens goda minne. Lastbilar för ”civilt” *host och harkel* bruk, etc… Minns ni de 50 högteknologiska motorbåtarna till Iran. Lustigt nog blev det motortorpedbåtar av allihopa. 🙂

Och USA ska vi inte tala om… Den hemliga hjälpen från USA till Saddam i det kriget Saddam förde mot Iran var ju nästan inte hemlig ens…

USA, ja… Kommittéer där många prominenta namn fans med, samlade in ”hjälp” till Afghanistan och Nicaragua i massor, plus Savimbis Angola och en del andra länder där lustigt nog hemlig underrättelse, och militär, verksamhet senare avslöjats…

Afghanistanfrågan var absurd i USA på 80-talet. De ”fantastiska” frihetskämparna från Afghanistan, långskäggiga muslimska fundamentalister vars fruar alltid var gömda bakom burkor, turnerade omkring i USA och beskrevs som västerlandets ”hopp”, och skyddet mot kommunismen, etc, etc… Deras underlydande är de som återfanns i Al Quadia och Talibanrörelsen senare. Och USA pumpade in massor av stöd där.

Keep your eyes on the ball, always the ball!

Andra sidan av en hemlig operation…

Om vi vet att hemliga maktpolitiska operationer funkar så, så är det lättare att se vad underrättelsetjänster gör om man FÖLJER flödet på planen.

Att USA rekryterat folk på plats i alla länder sen slutet av 90-talet för att höja säkerheten vid ambassaderna är ingen hemlighet. Det har gjorts offentligt. När man nu ställer sig frågan om Sveriges regering, UD och SÄPO känt till detta och de förenekar det, på olika sätt, är det ganska absurt. Jag har känt till det, eftersom det var offentlig information, men jag har inte vetat exakt hur det sett ut.

Men flödet är inte samma sak som bollen!

Det intressanta med hela detta som avslöjas om USA:s ”skyddsåtgärder” är att apparaten är större än nödvändigt.

USA är världens supermakt. Vad händer just nu om man kollar flödet på planen runt USA.

Jo, dels vill man ha kontroll över elektronisk kommunikation. Detta sker öppet. (Vilket gör att vi i vanlig ordning VET att det hemliga spionaget är många magnituder större än det inofficiella, som man kräver!)

Dels vill man skapa nätverk, plus ”skyddsgrupper” runt ambassader, för att hitta terrorhot i tid. Det torde inte vara svårt att veta vad detta innebär eftersom varje hemlig operation kräver att man har folk på plats, både folk som VET vad som pågår, och s.k. ”nyttiga idioter” som inte vet det.

Anledningen att regering och myndigheter ”inte känt till” USA:s spionage i EU-länderna torde vara att spionaget är mer omfattande än bara handla om skydd för ambassaden.

Jag tror inte att vår regering består av bara idioter, nämligen!

Wikileaks?

Wikileaks har kommit på tapeten. Vad ska man säga om det då?

Jag vet för lite om Assange som sådan… Men en sak är säker: att Wikileaksfallet gjort att vi hamnat mer under USA:s kontroll. Wikileaks behövs och deras status här i Sverige är oklar. Kommer de att vara kvar här, eller inte?

(En sak vill jag bara säga. Skjut inte pianisten när musikstycket är uselt, det kan vara kompositören som skrivit nåt kasst. När väl rättegångarna mot Assange börjat kommer många att gnälla på kvinnorna som anmält Assange. Fall inte i den fällan! Det är sällan så enkelt som man tror när man har foliehatten på huvudet!)

Till sist!

Vi har levt med två supermakter som haft (och har) förmågan att förstöra planeten med en knapptryckning i årtionden. Vi har haft en global ekonomi där det ansetts ok att miljoner människor dör i kolera och epidemier och där 30 miljoner barn dött av svält och undernäring vart år fram till nu. Och tänk… om man endast hade pumpat in en bråkdel av världens alla satsningar på vapen under ett år så hade man kunnat utrota svält och sjukdomar för gott, på mindre än ett decennium.

Det är inte konstigt att man blir arg. JAG HAR EN FÖRBANNAD SKYLDIGHET, OCH RÄTT, ATT FÅ BLI ARG!

Under det förra seklet hade vi massmord genom Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Röda Khmerer, galningarna i Kongo och Rwanda och masmord i f.d. Jugoslavien… Mitt framför våra ögon och ofta mitt framför det hemliga underrättelsespelets ögon!

Som människor, och världsmedborgare, på denna planeten har vi rätt att kräva insyn i hur supermakter och andra agerar. Jag har rätt att få bli arg!

Det har bevisats gång på gång att supermakter agerat t.o.m mot sina egna bästa intressen.

Hemliga operationer, i synnerhet de utanför demokratisk kontroll, för ofta med sig det negativa att det skapas en massa händelsekedjor utanför initiativtagarnas kontroll. Alltså måste de försöka kontrollera de nya händelsekedjorna, varpå nya skapas igen, etc, etc…

Vi behöver fler människor som följer flödet på spelplanen. ju fler som gör det, och som inte accepterar politikers ord för vad de är, ju bättre. Ja, vi behöver hemliga underrättelsetjänster och SÅPO och FRA som världen ser ut idag, men nån djävla ordning får det ändå vara!

Foliehattarna då? Ja, konspirationsteorier och sådana galenskaper gillar jag inte. Men anledningen till att konspirationsteorier om UFO:s, judars makt, muslimer, britter, kommunister, illuminati, etc, kan födas är att de med makten inte är ärliga och driver ett hemligt politiskt spel. Det är oärligheten som föder foliehattarna.

—————————————————-

Liberaldemokraterna

Jag är en av grundarna till Liberaldemokraterna.

Men åsikterna på bloggen är mina egna…

Vad är Liberaldemokraterna?

Liberaldemokraternas Facebookgrupp —– Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/Lib_dem

Vår hemsida finns här:

www.liberaldemokraterna.com

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Mer läsning:

https://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/11/19/datalagringsdirektivet-minns-joe-mccarthy-och-hans-holmer/

https://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/11/10/the-surveillance-detection-unit-finns-det-mer/

https://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/11/06/usa-spionerar-igen/

https://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/11/03/kontrollsamhalle-med-avigsidor/

https://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/11/01/terrohotet-som-bidde-en-tumme/

https://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/10/27/en-manniska-ar-mer-an-en-etta-eller-nolla/

https://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/10/17/afganistans-sak-ar-var/


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